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Rival union responses to the localization of work in US telecommunications 
Reading rival union responses to the localization of technical work in the US 
telecommunications industry 
Introduction 
Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, the market repercussions of state deregulation, 
combined with technological change, sparked profound changes for employees in the heretofore 
highly unionized US telecommunications sector. The wholesale restructuring of the AT&T Bell 
System and the growth of competitor firms’ market share led to declines in union density, 
yawning wage disparities among people doing similar work, and increased casualization and 
insecurity for holders of both customer service and technical jobs in the industry. However, these 
trends have manifested themselves somewhat differently for customer service and technical 
workers. While employers have typically followed a strategy of consolidating and regionalizing 
customer service and clerical labor, a significant amount of technical work, specifically the 
installation and maintenance of telecommunications infrastructure on customers’ premises, has 
grown more fragmented, structured by local labor market conditions and institutions (see Batt 
and Keefe 1999, Keefe and Batt 2002). 
 This paper examines the responses that this industry-wide restructuring of technical labor 
has prompted within two unions – the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
and the Communications Workers of America (CWA) – with an historic interest in representing 
telecommunications workers. With some success, the CWA has “scaled up,” employing 
innovative national bargaining and organizing tactics in the centralized workplaces of the 
companies once affiliated with the AT&T Bell System and developing trans-national 
relationships with other countries’ telecommunications unions. However, these strategies have 
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not prevented the CWA from losing ground as non-union competitors undercut the former Bell 
System affiliates (where most unionized workers are employed), as the former Bell affiliates 
themselves adopt increasingly draconian labor relations policies, and as labor markets for 
telecommunications technical employees become more localized. In contrast, the IBEW’s 
inherent capacity to represent workers at the scale of the local labor market, and thus to take 
advantage of the localization of technical work in the industry, has created new opportunities for 
that union and helped its construction division to reverse a decades-long trend of decline. More 
important, it has ensured high-paying jobs with benefits and training for a large number of 
telecommunications technical workers despite the fact that their jobs have been restructured out 
of the industry’s “core” and into a local regulatory realm dominated by small contractor firms 
operating at the scale of metropolitan regions.  
 In comparing the outcomes of the CWA’s and IBEW’s strategies in the post-deregulation 
telecommunications sector, the paper seeks to contribute to an ongoing dialogue in the 
geography literature about trade unions’ efficacy in shaping economic and political landscapes, 
and about the roles that scale and spatiality play in such struggles. While my case provides 
support for the argument of labor geographers such as Herod (2001), Savage (1998, 2004) and 
Walsh (2000) that beneficial “spatial fixes” for workers may emanate from strategies consciously 
pursued at the local level, I show that the pursuit of the geographic or “horizontal” approach does 
not align the IBEW with the progressive social movements that many labor geographers 
associate with localized activism.  The IBEW, rather than deliberately constructing scale, has 
embraced an organizing opportunity presented by a shift in industrial structure; its success in the 
new environment has less to do with deliberate choices than with the occurrence of 
circumstances favorable to the union’s strengths. In contrast, the Communications Workers 
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union is more closely allied than the IBEW with progressive labor organizing, and its leaders 
have thought carefully about how to manipulate scale to bring about favorable outcomes for 
workers in the context of restructuring. But legal and institutional constraints that prevent the 
centralized, nationally focused CWA from adapting effectively to industry change have 
overwhelmed its attempts to re-scale. 
 
Labor at the local scale 
Spatial strategies – not only the construction of uneven geographies of employment through the 
segmentation of production, but also the weakening of worker institutions in situ via the 
decentralization and localization of industrial relations – are recognized as fundamental to late 
capitalism (Clark 1989, Harvey 1982, 1988, Massey 1984). Only relatively recently, however, 
have geographers investigated workers as participants in the making of economic landscapes. 
According to Herod (2003: 112-113), workers, while constrained within a capitalist spatial 
system, “make their own geographies” much as they make their own histories. The relatively 
new project of labor geography is dedicated to exploring how this happens. 
In labor geography, the strategies and actions of unions figure prominently in accounts of 
workers shaping the space economy. As demonstrated in the work of Herod (1997, 1998, 2001), 
Jonas (1995, 1998) and Savage (1998, 2004), labor unions both act strategically at the scales 
“given” them by capital and produce new geographic scales and terrains in their efforts to 
organize new workers, advocate for existing members and, on occasion, to secure resources for a 
more expansive (and spatially defined) community. But within this literature the efficacy and 
advisability for unions of local vs. national or global strategies is vigorously debated. Some 
scholars have expressed skepticism about the durability of local efforts, asserting that 
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engagement at “the level of the nation-state and above” (Peck 1996, 257) is a far surer route to 
lasting gains for unions as capital globalizes and consolidates its power under neo-liberal 
governments. Others maintain that local gains, in addition to being more achievable, “may give 
[workers] purchase upon global economic and political processes” (Herod 2001, 52).  To present 
this dialogue as a pitched argument over whether unions should privilege local activism over 
national or global activity would be inaccurate; labor geographers acknowledge the need for 
strategies at multiple scales and for strategic changes of scale in response to different conditions. 
As Savage (2004) points out, however, labor unions must also make choices about where to 
concentrate limited resources. Moreover, union leaders face pressure from members to conceive 
of organizing and bargaining from a local perspective even when national or international 
strategies might better match the scale at which capital is operating (Clark 1989). Often, 
geographers have concluded, the local has of necessity become the level at which labor acts. In 
this context, as Herod’s work on longshoremen’s unions shows, unions actively delineate and 
defend local geographies in ways that preserve or enhance their power vis a vis capital (2001). 
While Herod focuses on workers in a traditionally unionized sector who attempt to 
defend worker prerogatives in the face of structural and technical change, other studies explore 
the geographic dimensions of recent efforts to organize beyond labor’s established strongholds. 
Recent accounts of successful labor organizing among low-paid employees in the service sector 
emphasize the efficacy of an approach that draws on the uniqueness of localities, builds on place-
based social solidarity and counters capital’s tendency to view communities merely as sites of 
production. In place-defined campaigns, labor leaders coalesce with progressive local 
organizations, linking issues of worker well-being to the quality and sustainability of a place and 
its entire population.  Advocacy for workers becomes advocacy for place, and geography 
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assumes an explicit class dimension. Contemporary successes by unions such as the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) and the Hotel and Restaurant Workers (HERE) and 
construction trades locals have spurred interest in the expressly geographic aspects of 
“community unionism” (Gray 2004, Savage 1998, 2004, Safford and Locke 2002, Waldinger et 
al 1998, Walsh 2000).   
 
Differences in union power at the local level 
The labor movement in the United States is highly diverse, however, with some unions better 
positioned than others to exert influence at a local scale. Prior to the Taft-Hartley Labor Act of 
1947, it was legal in the U.S. for unions to engage in multi-employer bargaining. Representing 
workers in many firms, spanning a local labor market, a single union local could negotiate 
market-wide wages and working conditions on behalf of unionized workers in a given 
occupation. Cobble, for example, documents local waitress unions which bargained with 
restaurant owners’ associations in major metropolitan areas throughout the first half of the 20th 
century (1991b). Under this arrangement, workers joined unions first, on the basis of 
occupational identity (“waitress,” “longshoreman,” or “machinist”) and then signed on with 
firms who belonged to employer associations which had signed a union contract. Unions and 
employer associations jointly funded training programs and health and retirement benefits funds 
that became available to all members in a given occupation within a labor market area.  In this 
way, the terms of a union-management agreement were defined not at the level of a firm but at 
the level of a local labor market  
The Taft-Hartley Act, however, proscribed multi-employer bargaining in most sectors, 
exempting only a few such as longshoring and the construction trades. Unions in industries 
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exempt from Taft-Hartley rules may recruit individual workers as members and organize 
employers across a local labor market, but most unions do not have this prerogative. Thus, while 
SEIU and HERE increasingly conceive of their organizing efforts as encompassing places as 
well as workplaces, they must organize and bargain with decontextualized, “non-placed” 
employers one by one. A cleaning contractor in Los Angeles is embedded within the political 
economy of that city, yet in the eyes of labor law it occupies a featureless landscape, sharing 
nothing in common with other cleaning contractors operating in the same labor market. That the 
janitors it employs may have much in common with other local janitors also goes 
unacknowledged in this worksite-bound model. In the construction trades, exemption from the 
Taft-Hartley bar on multi-employer bargaining enables both employer and worker interest 
groups to act as inhabitants of local places as well as on the basis of their connection to 
worksites.  
At the time Taft-Hartley was enacted, many industries, including telecommunications, 
were nationally regulated bureaucracies consisting of monopoly or oligopoly employers.  In this 
context, a union model based on worksite-based bargaining with reference to a centralized 
national pattern was functional. However, as American firms have become less vertically 
integrated and less subject to regulation, a union model predicated on the long-term stable 
attachment of workers to employers – and on employers’ adherence to national norms and 
standards – has arguably become less applicable, and the proscription of a local multi-employer 
bargaining option for most workers more problematic. One strain of thought in the industrial 
relations literature maintains that where centralized norms and standards do not hold sway, and 
where employers are small and flexible with workers moving frequently among them, a form of 
representation that puts an employer association across the table from a bargaining agent that 
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represents workers across a labor market – also known as a “horizontal” or “geographic” 
approach – has many virtues over workplace-by-workplace bargaining (Cobble 1991 a & b, 
1994, Herzenberg et al 1998, Wial 1993). In most instances, however, the geographic approach 
is not legal outside of the construction trades.  
 
Workplace-based bargaining, scale and organizational culture 
In addition to the legal factors that hamper unions from organizing at the local scale, there are 
cultural barriers. For many participants in an industrial relations system shaped by a New Deal-
era vision of wall-to-wall organizing in factories or “plants,” to organize workers locally by 
occupation would have been to extend an elitist legacy of craft unionism.  The major industrial 
unions that developed during the New Deal period, under the guidelines established by the 
Wagner Act of 1934, identified “good jobs” and effective representation with the enforcement of 
national industry norms that applied to all workers across workplaces rather than local standards 
that applied to designated “craftspeople.” Leaders of the industrial unions that emerged full force 
in the aftermath of Wagner aspired to uniformity across space through pattern bargaining with 
large, oligopolistic employers, often rejecting multi-employer contracts with small, locally 
owned firms as the arrangements of a fading era. The industrial unions of the New Deal era 
tended to be centrally controlled and bureaucratic; the contracts they negotiated were predicated 
not only on the existence of national standards but also on the long-term attachment of 
employees to firms, on full-time work, and on health and retirement benefits provided by 
employers, all aspects of a “New Deal Order” which also assumed an active managerial role for 
the federal government (see Lichtenstein 1989, 2002).  Observing that both the organization of 
work and the character of the national state have changed in the late 20th century, many argue 
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that this model of unionism is at best unstable (Cobble 1994; Herzenberg et al 1998, Rogers 
1995). The New Deal model, moreover, is not simply a legal system but also a set of shared 
cultural norms that shaped unions during that period. 
 From a theoretical perspective, the existence of distinct traditions in the American labor 
movement – a craft tradition linked to multi-employer bargaining at the local level and an 
industrial tradition linked with a strong focus on workplace-based bargaining, national norms 
and an active national state – has important implications for the understanding of how unions 
relate to scale. While labor organizations are indeed able to co-produce the space economy with 
those who control capital, their practices are informed and constrained (arguably more so than 
those of capital) by legal and cultural context. Geographers must understand variations in the 
scalar orientation of American unions as emanating not only from deliberate strategic choices but 
also from ingrained legal and historical tradition. The divergent approaches of the 
Communications Workers and the Electrical Workers to the representation of 
telecommunications technicians in the wake of deregulation illustrate this argument. 
 
The geographic structure of representation and bargaining in telecommunications  
 
 In the course of the 20th century, the US telecommunications industry shifted from a 
competitive, fragmented and unregulated sector to a nationally regulated bureaucratic monopoly 
and, recently, part of the way back. As this section will show, the IBEW and CWA are products 
of their respective eras.  
Labor organization in telecommunications began at the turn of the 20th century, during a 
relatively brief period between the expiration of Alexander Bell’s patent on the telephone (which 
enabled hundreds of small local competitors to enter the industry) and the federal government’s 
reconstitution of telecommunications as a private national monopoly. Between 1894 and 1913 
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outside linemen and inside wiremen working for the country’s burgeoning population of 
independent telephone companies organized along craft lines under the auspices of the American 
Federation of Labor’s International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. In organizing “telephone 
men,” the IBEW, like most AF of L unions, emphasized craft specialization and skill as the 
primary source of workers’ power. This power resided in local labor markets which IBEW 
controlled via the closed shop (Brooks 1977). As was typical of AFL unions at that time the 
IBEW excluded the non-native born, workers of color and women (Norwood 1990).  
During the First World War, the IBEW made further inroads in the telephone industry, 
but by this time the independent companies had been absorbed; via an agreement between the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and American Telephone and Telegraph, the sector had 
undergone consolidation in 1913 as the wide-reaching but closely regulated AT&T Bell 
monopoly. The IBEW represented over 20,000 telephone employees in the Bell System at the 
height of the war. However, when the federal government temporarily assumed control of the 
nation’s telephone and telegraph systems in 1918, its wartime power was used to undermine 
collective bargaining and to reinstate the open shop (Brooks 1977, Norwood 1990, Palladino 
1991). After a series of strikes that greatly weakened the IBEW, in the early 1920s Bell System 
executives capitalized on their position to supplant union locals with company-sponsored 
employee representation committees. This marked the end of the IBEW’s early dominance in 
telecommunications.  
After the militancy of the World War I period, AT&T dedicated great effort to promoting 
labor-management harmony and to staving off unions both through a “welfare work” program 
(pensions, paid vacations, insurance) and through a decentralized and carefully managed system 
of “employee representation plans,” (Keefe and Boroff 1994). Company unions predominated in 
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telecommunications from the early 1920s through the late 1930s as the AT&T Bell System 
expanded rapidly into a massive bureaucratic enterprise connected at every level with the 
administrative state. But with the US Supreme Court’s 1937 affirmation of the Wagner Act and 
its prohibition on company unions, the Bell companies were forced to sever their relationships 
with the employee associations. Bell employees, building from the base of the employee 
committees, then organized fledgling union locals. (Schacht 1985).  In 1939 a group of these 
committees, which represented plant and traffic employees from around the country, established 
an informal national network, calling themselves the National Federation of Telephone Workers, 
the predecessor to the CWA. Members of the new union eventually agreed to centralize the 
union’s structure and ultimately to affiliate with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
in 1949 (Barbash 1952, Schacht 1985).  
The Communications Workers of America was the colossus and pattern-setter in 
telecommunications from 1949 until the US Department of Justice forced the breakup of the 
AT&T Bell System in 1984. At deregulation, the CWA functioned as the collective bargaining 
and dispute resolution agent for over 500,000 telecommunications workers, spread across the 
United States but all working for the same employer. These workers included technicians, 
operators and workers who manufactured telecommunications equipment (where AT&T had also 
held a monopoly until the mid-1970s). Bargaining was highly centralized: while local union 
leadership bargained with the 50 state-based Bell operating companies over work administration 
and work rules, wages and benefits for all Bell employees were negotiated at a national 
bargaining table. Historian John N. Schacht argues that the union’s organizational structure 
evolved to mirror the centralized, monopolistic structure of the telecommunications industry 
(1985: 2-4).  Organizing in the telecommunications sector was all but unnecessary, since new 
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employees were automatically absorbed into the CWA when they went to work for “the phone 
company.” 
 
The CWA: adaptation in a transforming landscape 
With the erosion of national and state-level regulation, CWA’s strategic position in the 
telecommunications industry changed dramatically from the late 1970s onward. Dozens of large 
and mid-sized non-union employers entered the market, competing with the descendants of the 
still-unionized Bell companies (AT&T and the incumbent local exchange carriers -   ILECs - or 
“Baby Bells”) to offer consumers long distance service, internet service and, after 1996, local 
telephone service. The competitive strategies of the new market entrants battling the ILECs are 
predicated on the low compensation packages they offer workers relative to what union workers 
earn at the former Bell firms. In reaction, when Bell System-descended companies such as SBC 
Communications and BellSouth have entered new market segments such as the provision of 
internet services, they have attempted to form subsidiaries that are either non-union or that create 
two-tiered wage and benefit structures within the union membership (Keefe and Batt 1997, 
2002).  
Another factor in the disintegration of the sector’s unionized core arises from changes in 
the definition of ownership of the nation’s communications infrastructure. While premises 
telecommunications infrastructure (wiring and equipment located in commercial and residential 
buildings) was the legal property of “the phone company” until 1984, the Bell breakup 
transferred ownership of this infrastructure into the hands of end users who now are responsible 
for its installation and maintenance. These end users may hire the incumbent local phone 
company to perform this work if they choose, but they often rely on specialized contractors 
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known as customer premises equipment installation (CPE) contractors. With the growth of the 
Internet and data applications in the early 1990s, CPE contractors developed expertise in such 
areas as the installation of data cabling and the design and installation of computer-based local 
area networks and video-conferencing systems. Eighty percent of wiring inside of customers’ 
buildings is now performed by these contractors – largely local firms unaffiliated with the ILECS 
and not subject to state or federal regulation as telecommunications providers (Batt and Keefe 
1999, 124). 
Amidst these interrelated factors, union density in telecommunications plunged from 55.5 
percent in 1983 to 27.7 percent in 1998 (Keefe and Batt 2002). CWA’s telecommunications 
industry membership has also declined in absolute terms, from just over 500,000 to about 
308,000 (Figure 1). The union responded with a variety of adaptive strategies which, because of 
its centralized structure, have tended to be best articulated and most robust at the national level. 
While collective bargaining no longer takes place on a national, industry-wide basis, CWA 
national and local leaders have used their leverage in the traditional wireline units of the ILECs 
to preserve its remaining members’ prerogatives – employment security, high compensation, and 
advancement based on seniority. The CWA has retained power at the ILECs for two main 
reasons: first, because the former Bell affiliates continue to dominate local telephone service 
despite the introduction of competition into local telephone markets, and second because the 
union has cannily insisted on favorable bargaining outcomes as a condition of its support of the 
ILECs’ agendas before the state utility commissions that continue to regulate their activities 
(Keefe and Batt 2002). Though employment and union membership have declined at the “Baby 
Bells” and their descendants since divestiture, this has come about largely through attrition and 
reassignment rather than through layoffs, and jobs in the local wireline segment, particularly for 
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technicians, continue to offer the non-college-educated a high standard of living (see Batt et al. 
2000).   
CWA has also used leverage at the ILECs to keep regulated telecommunications work 
unionized.  Language in CWA contracts with former Bell affiliates commits ILECs to reversing 
previously implemented subcontracting arrangements, to avoiding subcontracting in the future, 
and to providing members with access to the “telecommunications jobs of the future” (such as 
those involved with business data services and Voice Over Internet Protocol) rather than 
classifying them as management positions (DuRivage 2000). Further, it commits the companies 
to remain neutral in the face of CWA organizing drives at their new wireless and cable 
subsidiaries, and to allow organization to take place via “card check” rather than the more 
arduous National Labor Relations Board election process (Bahr 2000). “Bargaining to organize,” 
as it is known, has led most notably to the representation of 10,000 employees at Cingular 
Wireless, a joint venture of SBC and BellSouth. CWA has used what is left of its national, 
industry-wide influence to expand its membership in growing occupational niches. 
As they have pioneered the strategy of “bargaining to organize” at the ILECs, CWA 
leaders have also thrown the union’s support behind localized initiatives to upgrade the skills of 
incumbent technicians. Recognizing the growing importance of computer proficiency to 
productivity in telecommunications, national-level officials formed the National Education and 
Training Trust (CWA/NETT), which offers incumbent members instruction leading to advanced 
certifications (such as data cabling and Cisco Systems’ A+ and Cisco Certified Network 
Associate or CCNA) at a favorable cost through their union locals. Placing high-tech learning 
labs in local union halls, national officials have hoped to build locality- and occupationally-based 
identity and solidarity that will remain with technicians even if they are bound for positions 
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outside the unionized core. At the same time, union leaders offer a kind of provisional union 
membership to non-CWA members (such as web designers, programmers and systems 
integrators, including independent contractors) through a program called Net-Pro that enables 
them to take CWA-sponsored on-line courses at a discount, with the hope that they will 
eventually become advocates for CWA representation in their workplaces. This initiative, while 
largely an internet-based endeavor that sees a “virtual” community as its constituency, has found 
a geographic expression in WashTech, a loose CWA-affiliated alliance of high-technology 
workers in the Puget Sound area.  
Finally, CWA has “scaled up,” developing ties with telecommunications unions in other 
countries through the Switzerland-based Union Network International (UNI). CWA executive 
vice president Larry Cohen is the president of UNI’s Telecom Sector interest group. Beyond 
simply connecting union members globally to promote dialogue and cooperation, UNI Telecoms, 
as it is known, has developed model regulatory principles which its affiliates adopt and advocate 
at the nation-state level (UNI Telecoms 2004). UNI Telecoms’ international regulatory agenda 
emphasizes the importance of continued national involvement in telecoms regulation not only to 
preserve jobs but also to further the goals of universal telephone service and access to broadband. 
Accordingly, the institution makes the case in published policy statements and press releases that 
the “narrow promotion of competition” under the deregulatory policies now unfolding in many 
countries takes place at the expense of investment, quality and, implicitly, employees’ and 
customers’ common well-being. This international strategy resonates with one described by labor 
geographers in local-scale research on unions: namely, the promotion of public regulation of 
collective consumption goods as a community issue (see Savage 2004). 
 
 14
Rival union responses to the localization of work in US telecommunications 
Legacies of a national-scale approach  
Despite CWA’s innovation at several scales, however, an increasing proportion of 
telecommunications workers fall outside the union’s ambit. While it successfully affiliated the 
34,000 member Newspaper Guild in 1997, the union has not organized many “information 
workers” in firms other than Bell System descendants in the aftermath of deregulation. I argue 
that this failure to capture membership in new industry segments is attributable both to legal 
constraints that have limited its ability to organize geographically and to its continuing identity 
as the national union of “the Bell System” at a time when the organization of work in the 
industry has localized and flexibilized. 
Recent conflicts within the union over local initiatives illustrate the potentially limiting 
features of the embedded “Bell System” legacy. In Northern California, Cleveland and Seattle, 
where some CWA locals represent employees of customer premises equipment (CPE) 
contractors, they have encountered opposition. “Many people believe we should be trying to 
push telecommunications work being done by contractors back into the core of the industry,” 
said one interviewee, “and thus there has been tremendous resistance within CWA to what 
amounts to facilitating the disintegration of the industry into smaller shops.” (Phillips interview 
2000). Thus, attempts to adapt to the localization of telecommunications technical work have 
been overcome by resistance on the part of those who see it as conflicting with the union’s 
national anti-subcontracting strategy. Similar resistance befell union attempts to pilot local 
“employment centers” in Ohio and Southern California whose purpose was to refer union 
members to CPE contractors on a temporary basis, thus giving the union a new role as a species 
of high-wage, benefits-providing temporary employment agency (Anderson 2000 interview, 
Philips 2000 interview, duRivage 2000). This experiment was discontinued in early 2000, again 
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in part because of resistance on the part of national leaders who opposed the union’s tacit 
cooperation in the subcontracting of work from the core of the industry.  
With respect to training, in contrast, CWA’s national officials have been pioneers, but local 
leaders’ and members’ reluctance to retreat from national Bell System norms has proven 
problematic. Most local CWA members have not responded enthusiastically to training 
initiatives sponsored by the union. This is in part because they often are connected with a 
proposed switch from seniority-based to skill-based advancement: employees at the ILECs, 
accustomed to being covered under broad national contracts, have proven reluctant to let new 
local arrangements around training and advancement alter established bargaining and contract 
management practices. In addition, members have not flocked to local union halls for training, 
implying that they do not identify strongly with their locals as place-based institutions. Those 
who have participated in CWA/NETT courses have done so largely on-line.  Another reason 
CWA locals have been slow to embrace training initiatives (not only training for members but 
also outreach efforts to non-members and to disadvantaged workers in the community) is that 
they make claims on resources many feel would be better spent on bread-and-butter issues.  One 
interviewee suggested that this reflects a disconnect between what he views as the “Bell-centric” 
attitude of the majority of CWA’s telecommunications sector membership and his ideal of a 
union local that identifies as part of its local community.   
A perhaps equally significant factor in CWA’s post-divestiture difficulties is the lack of a 
legal framework that would enable it to adapt structurally to the localization of technical work in 
an efficient way. In concert with the administrative framework jointly created in during the New 
Deal by government, business and union officials, the structures and processes of CWA are 
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centered on workplaces rather than labor markets, presuming members’ “long-term, continuous, 
on-site and full-time commitment to a single employer” (Cobble 1994, 286), in this case AT&T. 
In the Northern California, Cleveland and Seattle cases discussed above, CWA locals can 
represent employees of CPE contractors but they cannot engage in multi-employer bargaining 
with contractor associations as their counterparts in the building trades can. CWA contractors in 
these places do pay into joint funds that are used to provide training to union members; but 
efforts to create joint funds for health care and retirement benefits have encountered legal and 
logistical difficulties. The ease of multi-employer organizing, bargaining and benefits provision 
has worked to the advantage of the IBEW, as described in the next section.  
The IBEW: Re-entering the industry with a geographic model 
Like many building trades unions, the local construction affiliates of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers have traditionally had a reputation both inside and outside the 
American labor movement for their exclusivity and conservatism. Dominated by white men of 
northern European extraction, they have routinely excluded women and minorities. They also 
have a reputation for protecting high wages and benefits for existing members at the expense of 
organizing new members; from the 1950s through the 70s, even as the economy prospered and 
construction work expanded, construction electricians’ locals stubbornly restricted access to the 
trade. By the 1980s, these practices had contributed to steep declines in both the number of 
IBEW construction members and in the union’s market share in electrical construction (Palladino 
1991, Condit et al. 1998, Lewis and Mirand 1998). 
It might thus been seen as unlikely that IBEW construction locals would be able organize 
workers in the fast-paced telecommunications industry as it restructures. But in the past decade, 
increasing representation among customer premises telecommunications contractors has 
 17
Rival union responses to the localization of work in US telecommunications 
contributed to a steady increase in the IBEW’s construction industry membership (Figure 2). As 
of June 2000, between 11,000 and 12,000 telecommunications installers worked for member 
firms in the National Electrical Contractors Association (Borden 2000).  This represents 16% of 
the membership growth in the union’s construction division since 1995. Locals active in the 
telecommunications arena, typically located in metropolitan areas with strong union density, 
claim substantial telecommunications membership alongside their members who do traditional 
“high-voltage” electrical construction work (Figure 3). 
A critical factor in the IBEW’s success with small telecommunications contractors has 
been its ability to respond effectively to dynamics in local labor markets as the industry 
restructures. As noted above, an increasing proportion of technical work in telecommunications 
is now performed by single-proprietor contractors who relate directly to property owners with 
voice and data transmission infrastructure on their premises. Drawing on their experience in the 
construction trades, IBEW locals are able to focus on these new local labor market conditions. 
They negotiate a master contract covering an entire market with multiple employers (which are 
in turn organized into a contractors association, usually a chapter of the National Electrical 
Contractors Association, or NECA) and they work with those employers to maximize local 
opportunities for union work. Contract arrangements, which are mediated through local hiring 
halls, are based on a labor-market-wide bargaining unit. This structure is better suited than 
worksite-based bargaining to the volatile and highly local nature of customer premises 
equipment installation, in which employees frequently move among employers and employers 
add and shed workers frequently according to the constantly fluctuating volume of their 
workload.  
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 Multi-employer bargaining provides the organizational infrastructure for multi-employer 
careers. Through the hiring hall, members of an occupation are dispatched to employers, perhaps 
working many different “jobs” in a single year. But they carry benefits and privileges – such as a 
negotiated wage, health benefits, and pensions – from employer to employer within a local labor 
market. When demand for labor is high, as it was in premises telecommunications until recently, 
this produces not job security at a particular worksite but employment security across worksites. 
Employers benefit from the ability to vary the sizes of their workforces as competitive conditions 
demand it.  
Within this paradigm, a second key aspect of the IBEW’s local approach is the union’s 
participation in the skill development of the local labor supply.  In partnership with the National 
Association of Electrical Contractors (NECA), IBEW has developed training and apprenticeship 
resources specific to CPE firms. A Telecommunications Installer-Technician Apprenticeship 
Program, approved by the federal government in 1998, is now in use in over a hundred locations 
across the country. As of the summer of 2002, there were 8,000 apprentices enrolled in 
telecommunications training programs, out of a total of about 65,000 IBEW apprentices overall 
(Coleman interview 2002).  The guarantee of a skilled workforce has increased the union’s 
appeal among telecommunications contractors, whose job is to install increasingly sophisticated 
data systems on their customers’ premises.  
In addition to the portable training that IBEW members carry with them among 
employers within a local labor market, they carry health and pension benefits. Under the 
occupational model, benefits are organized through joint plans that cover all union members who 
work in a given locality. Employers reap the advantages of this as well, since it enables them to 
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hire workers on a flexible, “just-in-time” basis and still provide them with health and pension 
benefits and even paid vacations.   
The ability to provide access to the collective goods of health and retirement insurance is 
thus a third factor in the success of local partnerships between unions and contractors and in the 
general perception that the union is serving a general public purpose as a local institution, a 
purpose that extends beyond the boundaries of an individual workplace. Safford and Locke 
(2002) have argued that social embeddedness, or a set of ties that enables unions to build trust 
and legitimacy among varied local stakeholders, is a defining factor differentiating unions that 
have “rebounded” in the 1990s from those that have continued to decline.  
The IBEW’s success at representing technical workers in the unregulated 
telecommunications arena is accounted for in part by national-level union officials’ effort from 
the late 1980s forward to instigate a shift away from an insular, “country club” culture and 
toward a culture more open to organizing and welcoming new members. In 1990, officials at the 
union’s Washington, DC headquarters initiated the successful  COMET (Construction 
Organizing Membership Education and Training) program, geared toward changing members’ 
“outmoded and prejudicial thinking about organizing the non-union workforce” (Lewis and 
Mirand 1998: 299), and this program is credited with helping to boost the union’s construction 
industry membership in the following decade. Nevertheless, the IBEW’s capacity to take an 
adaptive, “geographic” approach to organizing and representing telecommunications workers has 
arguably been the decisive factor in the union’s expansion in that sector. After being supplanted 
by a centralized industrial union at mid-century, IBEW locals re-entered the industry in the 
1980s and 90s, with a strategy based on fulfilling telecommunications employers’ and 
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telecommunications technical employees’ needs at the local scale. In metropolitan areas with 
relatively high union densities, they have been able do this. 
 
Community unionism? 
IBEW locals’ craft union heritage, with its emphasis on control of local labor markets, has 
enabled them to take a geographical approach to organizing in a transforming industry sector. 
IBEW’s activities have ensured that technical workers who now fall outside the core of the 
telecommunications sector continue to have (though on far different terms) middle-class wages, 
benefits, and representation in the workplace. As labor market intermediaries for 
telecommunications technicians, as well as in their analogous roles with conventional 
electricians, IBEW locals have made some progress in recent years in reaching out to workers 
that the union has traditionally excluded. An example of increasing progressivism within IBEW 
is Local 164 in New Jersey. This statewide local has come to view its telecommunications 
technician apprentice program as an opportunity to offer training and high-wage work to people 
who would otherwise have limited means of securing them. Local 164 currently has a grant from 
the New Jersey Department of Education for a “Youth Transition to Work” initiative, which 
enrolls students at vocational high schools in a pre-apprenticeship program. The union helps 
teachers prepare their students for the IBEW apprenticeship, and also coordinates site visits and 
field trips to give the students an orientation to the industry and the union. As of 2001, fifty of 
the participants in the program had entered the telecommunications technician apprenticeship, 
which starts at $11.48/hour plus benefits and leads to progressively higher wages and, 
eventually, journeyman technician status. The program has helped to build greater trust between 
the union, local vocational schools and community-based institutions like alternative schools 
 21
Rival union responses to the localization of work in US telecommunications 
with which the vocational schools frequently partner, and its existence makes it more likely that 
a union-sponsored career path will be available to a wider variety of high school graduates than 
has traditionally been the case.  
But Local 164 is the exception. In many ways, the IBEW remains a conservative and 
exclusive institution. Evidence from two other IBEW locals examined for this research (in Los 
Angeles and the Bay Area respectively) suggests that programs like Local 164’s are exceptional. 
While they cite efforts to build relationships with educational institutions, community groups and 
“non-traditional employment for women” initiatives, representatives of the Los Angeles and 
Northern California locals do not view recruitment into their training programs as a strategy to 
build new social and institutional ties in their regions. Nor are any of the locals connected with 
community work to promote social and economic justice or to encourage solidarity outside of the 
employment context. Ultimately, the very “localness” of IBEW’s locals makes it unlikely that 
the union will become a powerhouse of social activism. National-level leaders have broken 
ground in the last decade with the COMET initiative and with a standardized national approach 
to telecommunications training (which they have undertaken in collaboration with the industry 
association NECA) but according to one international union representative, “[Locals] answer to 
the international office but they still get to do what they want.” Embedded in traditions and 
decades-old political alliances, any remain steeped in the insular practices that characterized the 
union through the 1980s, and their power is derived from this entrenchment.   
Furthermore, the ethos of many IBEW locals is grounded in hidebound and arguably 
counter-productive attachment to a craft identity. While representatives of the international argue 
that a separate occupational classification and separate skill-specific training for 
telecommunications technicians are crucial to the successful organization of new firms in 
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telecommunications, many assert that communications work should be done by journeyman 
electricians, and thus resist the formation of both distinct training programs and distinct 
organizing programs for telecommunications. They want to maintain the new work as the 
province of their craft as they defined it at the turn of the century. Interviewees associated with 
Local 11 in Los Angeles argue that even now, telecommunications remains a low priority in the 
local because of an “inside wiring mentality” that persists among union officials and leading 
contractors alike. IBEW locals in several cities have also devoted time and resources to 
fomenting ongoing jurisdictional conflict with the CWA over telecommunications work, 
attempting to keep firms whose workers are represented by CWA out of the CPE market 
altogether using such tactics as intimidation and, reportedly, sabotage of infrastructure installed 
by CWA technicians.  
 
Conclusion 
Struggles to define and control the geographic scale at which workers and firms negotiate have 
occurred in almost every industry in the context of post-Fordist globalization and deregulation. 
What is exceptional about the U.S. telecommunications sector is the existence of two rival 
unions – the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) and the Communications 
Workers of America (CWA) – which present divergent models of organizing and representation.  
While the Communications Workers union dominated in telecommunications for most of the 20th 
century, the restructuring of the industry, which entailed the decentralization and localization (or 
re-localization) of many technical jobs away from the “core” of the sector, presented the 
institution with many challenges. As a union which traditionally negotiated for 
telecommunications workers with a single regulated employer at a national bargaining table, 
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CWA has used its power with Bell-descended employers to counter, as best it can, the industry 
trends that have followed deregulation. The CWA’s structure and culture have biased the union 
toward national strategies, and additionally its work over the past decade has increasingly 
focused on the development of an international solidarity movement with telecommunications 
unions in Europe and Central and South America. But despite this effort to both adapt at the 
national level and to “scale up,” CWA’s telecommunications membership has declined.  For 
nearly half a century, the union was concerned with creating standard, uniform national wages 
and working conditions across the industry and employed organizing and bargaining strategies 
that strove for uniformity across space. Particularities of and distinctions among local labor 
markets did not figure into this strategy. Union officials are now committed to recapturing the 
“wall-to-wall” organization across the entire communications industry that they once had in the 
Bell System (Keefe and Boroff 1994, Keefe and Batt 1997, Bahr 1998); their challenge is that 
the industry’s walls have become much less clearly defined as work has become more flexible 
and employers, on the technical side at least, have become smaller, more numerous and more 
subject to the dynamics of local labor markets. 
In contrast, telecommunications restructuring has created opportunities for the IBEW, the 
craft union originally responsible for organizing the industry in the late 19th century. Changes 
that have taken place since deregulation – in particular the contracting out of work – have 
positioned the IBEW as a viable representative of telecommunications employees. IBEW 
construction locals, with a structure and culture forged predominantly in local construction 
markets at the turn of the century, have used a multi-employer, labor-market-wide approach to 
gain new members. As a result, deregulation and devolution of the employment relationship to 
the local level has not led to the weakening of organized labor’s influence on wages and working 
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conditions or to the transformation of “primary labor market” jobs to poorly paying, “dead-end” 
work.  
However, it cannot be argued that the IBEW has deliberately “constructed scale” in this 
environment. Rather, the union has embraced a new organizing opportunity presented by a shift 
in industrial structure which favors its traditional strengths. Thus, the pursuit of the geographic or 
“horizontal” approach does not align the IBEW with the progressive social movements that 
many labor geographers associate with localized activism. National leaders have made some 
progress by encouraging locals to be less exclusive and more open to viewing 
telecommunications technology as a “craft” distinct from that of a conventional journeyman 
electrician. However, the culture of turn-of-the-century craft unionism remains very much alive 
within the institution. As Cobble notes in her work on waitress unions, craft solidarity, an 
approach which “emphasize[s] the occupational identity of the worker and tie[s] union power 
to….the occupation” (1991b, 9) can be a source of self-esteem and power for union members. It 
may also give rise to jurisdictional conflict, limit workplace flexibility and become an arena in 
which to act on racial or ethnic bias. In this case, it has by many accounts led IBEW members to 
use destructive tactics against members of a rival union. 
The case described in this paper suggests that it labor geographers analyzing unions’ 
efforts to “construct scale” must consider that notions of scale inscribed in law and custom have 
strong pull. The differences between CWA’s and IBEW’s status under the Taft-Hartley Act, as 
well as their different relationships to the “New Deal Order,” create the fundamentally distinct 
legal, administrative and cultural environments in which they work. The strategies and practices 
of each institution – the CWA’s national focus and reluctance to give up “Bell System” norms 
for example – are a result of their immersion over decades in these environments. Union 
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protagonists construct scale deliberately, to be sure, but their efforts are circumscribed by the 
parallel scale-constructing strategies of state actors as well as corporate ones.  
This case also resonates with a current debate in the U.S. labor movement over 
jurisdictional conflict among unions. With union membership at a low ebb, many are criticizing 
inter-organizational rivalries within the movement, maintaining that they preoccupy leaders and 
cause fragmentation of organizing and bargaining power.  Some labor leaders have suggested 
mergers or mandatory collaboration among unions representing workers in similar industries, or 
of similar occupations; one restructuring proposal would merge the AFL-CIO’s 58 international 
unions into 15-20 “mega-unions” responsible for particular economic sectors such as health care, 
construction and airlines (see Bai 2005, Bernstein 2004, Moberg 2005) This case suggests that 
the CWA and IBEW each bring valuable strengths to the project of representing technical 
workers in a restructured telecommunications sector, and that if the rivals were to collaborate, a 
combined effort might surpass the separate and competing efforts now being waged.  It remains 
to be seen, however, whether the “mega-unions” advocated by reformers would have flexibility 
to navigate at multiple scales, negotiating multi-employer agreements locally in some cases 
while pursuing national or international strategies where employers operate as national or multi-
national entities.  This study thus concludes with a theme that recurs frequently in the industrial 
relations literature: the need for a national labor law framework in the United States that better 
reflects the nature of 21st century workplaces.  
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* At divestiture, the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies. Today, SBC, 
Verizon, BellSouth and Qwest (see Chapter 3). As shown in the yellow band at the 
top of the columns for 2000 and 2002, CWA now represents about 10,000 
employees of Cingular wireless, a collaboration between SBC and BellSouth. 
 
** In 1996, Lucent Technologies spun off from AT&T; in 2000, Avaya 
Communications spun off from Lucent. 2000 figures include AT&T and Lucent. 
2002 figures include AT&T, Lucent and Avaya. 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on data from Communications Workers of 
America, Keefe and Boroff 1994, and Keefe, personal communication, 2002. 
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300 300 K Local originally had “sound and 
communications” employers under contract 
– did alarm systems, nurse call, closed-
circuit television. Then, “many of our big 
electrical contractors got into teledata.” But 
this was not until the mid-1990s, so the 
local “missed the ball” to some extent. 
Difficult in local anti-union environment to 
organize contractors who were not 
previously NECA electrical contractors; 
difficult to convince inside wiremen in the 
local that telecom is a separate occupation. 
Recruit from 
occupational 
centers run by 
the school 







1250 2.5 million Early entrant - began organizing telephone 
interconnect companies in the late 1970s 
because they recognized opportunity 
presented by Carterfone decision. Began 
conducting industry-specific training in the 
1980s. For the first 10-12 years, bottom-up 
organizing, “but now contractors are asking 
for appointments.”  
State-funded 
youth transition 













2550 4 million Began in 1992 with some electrical 
contractors starting low-voltage divisions. 
Built apprenticeship program and were 
ready to organize purely VDV contractors 
when the market picked up in the mid-
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APPENDIX: Interviews with CWA and IBEW Representatives 
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